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ARVID PARDO*
The San Diego Law Review is to be congratulated for its ninth
annual Law of the Sea (LOS) symposium: The contents are well
written, and all the articles make a significant contribution to the
understanding of present and evolving law of the sea.
Apart from a useful annotated synopsis of recent LOS develop-
ments,' the issue contains two different groups of papers: those
dealing with the interpretation of customary rules and of agree-
ments made when such rules were accepted international law and
papers commenting on developments at the 1976 sessions of the
United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Papers in the first group are those by Messrs Lowe, 2 Froman,3
and Sisco.4 All are based on extensive research, and their con-
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1. Synopsis: Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1976-1977,
14 SAN Dizo L. Rav. 718 (1977).
2. Lowe, The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law,
id. at 597.
3. Comment, Kiev and the Montreux Convention: The Aircraft Carrier
that Became a Cruiser to Squeeze Through the Turkish Straits, id. at 681.
4. Comment, Hot Pursuit from a Contiguous Fisheries Zone-An Assault
on the Freedom of the High Seas, id. at 656.
clusions are convincing. Also all, either implicitly or explicitly,
demonstrate the weaknesses of present law.
Professor Lowe's paper on the The Right of Entry into Maritime
Ports in International Law reaches the conclusion that "the ports
of a State ... designated for international trade are, in the absence
of express provisions to the contrary, presumed to be open to the
merchant ships of all States" and that such ports "should not be
closed to foreign merchant ships except when the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State necessitates closure.' 'a
The presumption that ports are open may well be reasonable as
Professor Lowe suggests, but Professor Lowe himself is constrained
to note considerable State practice suggesting that no right of entry
exists and the presumption is further eroded by recent practice of
some States prohibiting or restricting access to their ports of certain
categories of vessels (nuclear powered vessels, large tankers, and
others) while denial of entry on vague security or political grounds
appears to be becoming more common in some parts of the world.
Under these circumstances it is difficult to maintain the existence
of any clear presumption of a right of entry0 of foreign merchant
vessels into the ports of a State, and we could well expect, in the
present international climate and in the present chaotic state of
the LOS, that the entry of foreign merchant vessels into a State's
ports may become a matter entirely within the discretion of the
State concerned unless the UNCLOS makes some effort to clarify
the situation.
Mr. Froman's important and timely paper on the Kiev and the
Montreux Convention: The Aircraft Carrier that Became a Cruiser
to Squeeze Through the Turkish Straits demonstrates another
weakness of international law. Here we are not confronted with
the problem of attempting to deduce a presumption or a rule of
law from the varying practice of States, but rather with the failure
to update an important convention in order to take into account
technological developments and with the political reluctance to pro-
test a serious violation of an important and reasonably explicit
agreement. This inaction undermines a convention as surely as the
changing practice of States erodes presumed customary law. Mr.
Froman convincingly demonstrates that the passage of the Kiev has
weakened the 1936 Montreux Convention and that continued failure
5. Lowe, supra note 2, at 622.
6. Professor Lowe does not discuss the rights of exit of foreign merchant
vessels from the ports of a coastal State. What restrictions can reasonably
be applied to the departure of foreign merchant vessels by the coastal
States? It is an interesting question which merits analysis and perhaps also
some attention at UNCLOS.
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on the part of Turkey and the NATO powers to oppose evasion
of its terms may deprive the Convention of all meaning, with incal-
culable political and strategic consequences in the Mediterranean
and the Indian Ocean.
The third article in this group, Hot Pursuit from a Contiguous
Fisheries Zone-An Assault on the Freedom of the High Seas,
although well researched and argued has historical rather than
contemporary significance in view of the increasingly numerous
claims of States to exclusive economic zones (EEZ's). Neverthe-
less, the article is useful because it spotlights the often overlooked
role of municipal courts in the United States, as elsewhere, in
undermining present LOS in order to protect the convenience of
States.
The four papers analyzing and commenting upon various aspects
of the 1976 LOS negotiations constitute the major part of the con-
tents of this issue of the San Diego Law Review. Professor
Fleischer's 7 approach is legal: His main, indeed his only, concern is
to demonstrate that the coastal State has already acquired the legal
right to establish by unilateral decision a 200-mile wide fishery zone.
Professor Clingan's8 interesting paper is written from the perspec-
tive of a country with a wide spectrum of important ocean space in-
terests, including political and strategic interests. Professor Clingan
is mainly concerned with the possible erosion of the traditional high
seas freedom of navigation and communication 9 as a consequence
of the wording of the definition of the high seas contained in Article
75, part 2 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) read in
conjunction with articles 44, 46, 47, and others dealing with the
rights of the coastal State within the EEZ. Dr. Barkenbus'0 and
Mrs. Borgese"' are concerned with international seabed issues dis-
7. Fleischer, The Right to a 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone or a
Special Fishery Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548 (1977).
8. Clingan, Emerging Law of the Sea: The Economic Zone Dilemma, id.
at 530.
9. Art. 2, Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958,
13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. The term navigation and
communication is found in Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. 2, art. 46(1) (1976) [hereinafter cited as
RSNT].
10. Barkenbus, Seabed Negotiations: The Failure of United States Policy,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623 (1977).
11. Borgese, The New International Economic Order and the Law of the
Sea, id. at 584.
cussed in Committee I of UNCLOS. Dr. Barkenbus comments upon
the failure of United States policy and advocates its accommodation
to the political goals of the Group of 77 in the context of an evolving
institutional framework for seabed minerals beyond national juris-
diction. Mrs. Borgese's essay has a wider perspective. She demon-
strates the need for the UNCLOS to create an institutional frame-
work embodying the principles of the New International Economic
Order advocated by developing countries and makes constructive
suggestions in this connection with regard to the concept of the
Enterprise which, according to the RSNT, will be the operational
organ of the future International Sea-bed Authority.12 Finally, Ms.
Ferguson 3 describes the goals of landlocked countries in the LOS
negotiations and analyzes the prospects for their achievement.
All the essays make a significant contribution to the understand-
ing of the complex and vital issues of law, politics, economics, and
equity which the international community is attempting to resolve
at the UNCLOS. Nevertheless, inevitably, the essays reflect, in
greater or lesser measure, the ideological conflict and conceptual
disarray which have delayed the work, and are likely to distort the
results, of the UNCLOS. With the possible exception of Mrs. Bor-
gese's all too brief paper, all the essays are written from the view-
point of national or group interest and consider only legal or po-
litical issues. Unfortunately, this situation accurately reflects the
reality of the negotiations and is a major factor in the difficulty
experienced by the UNCLOS in producing results which can be ac-
quiesced in by the overwhelming majority of States large and small,
coastal and landlocked, rich and poor.
A number of factors, analyzed by many authors, make the present
LOS negotiations exceptionally difficult. Among these factors are
the inherent importance and complexity of the subject, the number
of participating States, the irrational division of the subject matter
among the conference plenary and three different committees, the
number of conflicting national and group interests involved, and
many others. However, a major factor, if not the major factor, is
the inability of the negotiators to develop a comprehensive concept
of the purpose of the negotiations.
12. The term International Sea-bed Authority (ISA) is used both in the
Single Negotiating Text and in the RSNT. However, in the RSNT all refer-
ences to any direct competence of the future Authority over the sea-bed
have disappeared and have been replaced by references to Authority control
over activities (defined as "all activities of exploration for, and exploita-
tion of, the resources of the Area") in the Area. Hence some writers now
use the term International Sea-bed Resource Authority (ISRA).
13. Comment, UNCLOS III: Last Chance for Landlocked States?, 14 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 637 (1977).
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It is naively assumed that the purpose of the negotiations is mere-
ly to produce stability of expectations and to accommodate divergent
or conflicting interests in the marine environment: When these
interests cannot be accommodated, resort should be made either to
power politics to further national or group interests or to accep-
table ambiguous formulations to be interpreted in due course
through future binding dispute settlement procedures.
Obviously, stability of expectations and accommodation of con-
flicting interests are necessary goals, but LOS negotiations are not
trade negotiations; they involve not only national, group, or sectoral
interests but also the future of a dangerously weakened world
order. In this perspective the exercise of power to impose gross
inequities should be avoided, although its exercise to abate claims
either that endanger world order or that are inherently inequitable
may be constructive. Finally, the predilection for ambiguity in cru-
cial matters which marks the RSNT guarantees future conflict and
the ineffectiveness of any compulsory and binding dispute settle-
ment system that may be established by the UNCLOS.
14
In short, if the UNCLOS is to be successful-that is, if it is to
produce results which are viable and stabilizing-participating
States must keep in mind not only their national interests but also
the interests of the entire international community in the context of
rapidly evolving technology and intensifying and diversifying ocean
space uses. This situation places a particular responsibility for the
success of the UNCLOS on the major maritime powers and on those
countries, whether "developed" or "developing," which have long
coasts fronting on the open oceans. The former have world-wide
interests and a complete spectrum of maritime capabilities; the
latter have the geographical prerequisities to utilize the UNCLOS
for the purpose of appropriating the resources of the greater part
of the oceans to the detriment of the majority of States.
14. Part IV of the RSNT, supra note 9, provides for the creation of a
comprehensive, but flexible, compulsory, and binding dispute settlement
system. The practical effectiveness of the system proposed is, however,
doubtful not only because of the exceptions listed in Article 18, but also
because the quality of the agreement which is being negotiated-for exam-
ple, the degree of specificity and comprehensiveness in the treatment of im-
portant issues-is mediocre. This limitation critically affects acceptability
of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures envisaged. When the law
is not reasonably clear, States cannot permit an international court to dis-
pose of their important interests.
However, instead of providing an example of responsibility and
restraint, both the major maritime powers and States with long
coastlines have concentrated on protection of their perceived
national interests with little thought for others or for the future.
Indeed wealthy states, such as Norway, Canada, and Australia,
renowned for their love of peace and for their respect for
international law, have distinguished themselves among the organ-
izers and leaders of the Gadarene rush toward maximum feasible
appropriation of ocean space.
Perhaps voluntary restraint and consideration of the vital needs
of others should not be expected when the goal is merely preser-
vation of the existing legal order in ocean space modified only by
a shift in its balance from freedom in the greater part of ocean
space to sovereignty or national jurisdiction. Apparently forgotten
is the original major purpose of the UNCLOS-the creation of a
new, more rational, and more equitable international order in ocean
space to replace a traditional order which is irremediably collapsing,
not because a group of States may want it to collapse but because
the assumptions on which it was constructed have ceased to cor-
respond to reality.1
The details of a new order in ocean space may be conceived in
different ways, but the basic choice which the international com-
munity faces is clear-either progressive, but eventually complete,
nationalization of ocean space or effective internationalization of
ocean space beyond reasonable national jurisdictional limits on the
basis of the common-heritage-of-mankind concept.
This is not the place to analyze the consequences for international
order of the adoption of one or the other option. It is sufficient to
note that the UNCLOS appears to have definitely chosen nationali-
zation. I do not attach, in this connection, excessive importance
to the concept of an EEZ which is quite compatible with effective
internationalization of ocean space beyond national jurisdiction. In
fact, the EEZ concept only consolidates conveniently into an inte-
grated regime a variety of claims to exclusive access to resources
15. Grotius explicitly based the principle of freedom of the seas on the
assumption that the living resources of the sea were inexhaustible-a
clearly erroneous assumption under modern conditions. Grotius also be-
lieved that the oceans were sufficiently vast to accommodate all naviga-
tional uses without need for regulation. See Comment, supra note 4; at
660-61 n.25. This belief no longer holds true in congested seas such as the
British Channel or the Mediterranean. Furthermore, three hundred years
ago, it was assumed that humanity's activities could not seriously impair
the quality of the marine environment and that the oceans were so vast
and their resources so unlimited that serious conflicts of use were impossible.
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and to control of activities in the marine environment which coastal
States have advanced with increasing frequency in recent years.
Far more significant indications of the intention in due course com-
pletely to nationalize ocean space are: (a) the refusal by the
UNCLOS majority to set clear limits to national jurisdiction in the
seas; 16 (b) the minimal, unambiguous legal obligations of coastal
States in the vastly expanded areas which it is proposed to place
under their jurisdiction; 17 (c) the failure to establish a permanent
mechanism to supervise treaty implementation and to facilitate the
achievement of the goals set by the RSNT with regard to a wide
variety of matters from conservation of migratory fish stocks to
establishment of international marine pollution standards; and (d)
the establishment of two not necessarily compatible regimes for
ocean space beyond national jurisdiction-an obsolescent high seas
regime for the seas and a recessive and unworkable regime based
16. Although the 200-nautical mile wide EEZ has been much discussed,
few observers have drawn attention to the fact that the breadth of the EEZ
is measured not from the coast but from baselines and that the coastal State
may draw straight baselines of unlimited length (straight baselines more
than 350 miles long have already been drawn by some coastal States) en-
closing as internal waters very large marine areas. As a consequence of
the baseline provisions of the RSNT, the limits of the EEZ will be far more
than 200-nautical miles from the nearest coast. Also the sovereign rights
of a coastal State over the continental shelf will extend either to 200-nauti-
cal miles "from the baselines [not the coast] from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured" or "throughout the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin" at the choice
of the State concerned. RSNT, supra note 9, pt. 2, art. 64. Because it is
very difficult in practice objectively to delimit the continental shelf on the
basis of the criterion of the "outer edge of the continental margin" and
because the RSNT establishes no impartial verification mechanism, coastal
States have ample opportunity to delimit and re-delimit their legal con-
tinental shelves as they choose. All islands, however minute (apart from
rocks "which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life"), also are
recognized extensible EEZ's and continental shelves. In addition, coastal
States have recognized competence with regard to resources beyond the
EEZ (e.g., RSNT, supra note 9, pt. 2, arts. 55 & 56).
17. Instances of coastal State duties couched in general or ambiguous lan-
guage are too numerous to quote. In some cases the duties are clear
enough, but their practical significance is small. For instance, coastal States
which do not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch of
living resources in the EEZ have the duty through "agreements and other
arrangements" to give other States access to the surplus of the allowable
catch. But it is the coastal State itself which determines both the allow-
able catch and its own capacity to harvest it. Id. arts. 50 (1) & 51 (2)- (3).
The duty to concede access, in short, is more apparent than real. See
Fleisher, supra note 7.
on the common-heritage concept for the seabed.1 8 Neither regime
can effectively fill the present political and jurisdictional vacuum
in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction. Therefore, the vacu-
um will be filled as interests dictate and opportunity offers by
coastal State authority. The result can be only increased in-
equality19 and increased conflict among States.
The alternative to nationalization of ocean space is effective inter-
nationalization. Internationalization does not ignore national inter-
ests; rather it aims at their accommodation within a legal frame-
work conducive to the achievement of common goals. This concept
is similar to the rationale underlying the traditional principle of
the high seas.20 The high seas principle is, in a sense, negative:
Nobody is responsible for the high seas; everybody may use the high
seas for any purpose and as intensively as desired subject to a
reasonable regard for the interests of other States. The concept
18. The regime for the international seabed area is recessive-that is,
the area over which it applies will diminish more or less rapidly for reasons
beyond the control of the future Authority, for the limits of the interna-
tional area are determined exclusively by whatever action may be taken
by coastal States with respect to the legal continental shelf. The future
Authority is obligated to conform without question to whatever notifications
it receives from States Parties. RSNT, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 2. The
regime is unworkable, partly for the reasons mentioned in Mrs. Borgese's
paper, supra note 11, and partly because the UNCLOS has not realized that,
because of unlimited straight baselines, virtually undefined continental
shelves, archipelagic and island provision, coastal State authority over the
seabed will extend many hundreds of miles from the coast. (Canada, for
instance, has already made "continental shelf" claims to seabed areas lying
more than 650 miles from the coast.) Under these circumstances the future
Sea-bed Authority will control only a portion-a diminishing portion-of
manganese nodule resources. This situation makes it impossible for the
Sea-bed Authority to fulfill many of its assigned functions, such as "to
protect against the adverse economic effects of a substantial decline in the
mineral export earnings of developing countries." BSNT, supra note 9, pt.
1, art. 9(4). The organizational structure of the Authority and of the
Enterprise is also unrealistic. The latter, for instance, is provided with a
political Governing Board and a staff of civil servants chosen on the basis
of "equitable geographical distribution," when the need is to compete
effectively with manganese nodule development within national jurisdiction.
19. On the assumption of a median line division of ocean space, 15 States
would acquire nearly 45% of the oceans. More than 60 States (landlocked,
fronting on internal seas, or with short coastlines on the oceans) would ac-
quire little or nothing. On the basis of the provisions of the RSNT, present
inequality is also markedly increased. A few States acquire millions of
square miles of ocean space, while States like Gambia, Ghana, and Togo
acquire very little.
20. Unrestricted use for trade and fisheries (with reasonable regard to
the interests of other States) of an area considered immeasurably vast and
rich in living resources accommodates the interests of all, including non-
users (who can obtain imported products at prices lower than they would
otherwise be).
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
is rooted in the assumption of abundance-abundance of space,
abundance of resources-in conditions of limited demand and of
unsophisticated technology. Under modern conditions these as-
sumptions are no longer realistic, and hence the high seas will dis-
appear. A new legal order which reflects modern conditions must
take its place, if total nationalization of ocean space is to be avoided.
The high seas are now a commons, abused and threatened with
division: The commons requires management by the users to avoid
abuse and to improve yields. Thus the new legal order must have
positive goals such as (1) flexible accommodation of multiplying ex-
clusive and inclusive uses of ocean space; (2) the provision of ex-
panding opportunities to all countries in the use of ocean space be-
yond national jurisdiction; 21 (3) ecological protection of ocean
space; 22 (4) management and development of ocean space resources
beyond national jurisdiction for the benefit of all countries and
equitable sharing of the financial and other benefits derived from
resource development, with particular regard to the needs of poor
countries.
21. In a condition of total division of ocean space the opportunities of
the coastal State would decrease (in general) in the fields of trade and
communications and would increase in the field of resources only until all
resources within national jurisdiction are intensively exploited. This limit
is soon reached when resources within national jurisdiction are limited or
when the area is small. Efficient international management of the major
part of ocean space avoids the constraints on activities imposed by fragmen-
tation of the oceans into more than 100 large and small sovereign areas with
different rules, standards, and procedures for the conduct of activities.
22. Part 3 of the RSNT deals with prevention and control of marine
pollution. The general principles proposed by the RSNT are a constructive
development of present international law, but the methods proposed for the
implementation of these principles are likely to be quite ineffective in prac-
tice (except for vessel source pollution, probably responsible for less than
10% of total marine pollution). The approach adopted in the RSNT,
generally speaking, urges States to act through an unnamed "competent in-
ternational organization or through general diplomatic conferences" in es-
tablishing international rules, standards, and recommended practices with
regard to vessel source marine pollution and through competent (or appro-
priate) international (or intergovernmental or regional) organizations for
other actions recommended. It is notorious that at the international level
(pollution abatement) competences are highly fragmented and uncoordi-
nated at the policy level. The RSNT does not attempt to give some order
to the present chaos, largely because most UNCLOS representatives lack
any general concept of a marine order.
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An effective international order in ocean space can be established
if international accord is reached on six points.
(1) Adoption of the concept of ocean space comprising the surface
of the sea, the water column, the seabed, and its subsoil. This
action is essential because activities in the marine environment
increasingly involve the seas in all their dimensions.
(2) Agreement on a clear and precise definition of the limits of
national jurisdiction for all purposes. This point is vital because
otherwise coastal State jurisdiction will continue to expand.
23
(3) Supersedure of the concept of common heritage of mankind
over the traditional concept of the high seas. The concept of
common heritage of mankind has five basic characteristics. First,
nonappropriation: The common heritage of mankind cannot be sub-
jected to national sovereignty or jurisdiction; 24 it can be used, but
not owned. Second, management: The common heritage of man-
kind requires a system of management in which all users share.
Third, active sharing of benefits, not only financial but also those
derived from shared management and transfer of technologies.
This sharing changes traditional concepts of development aid and
the structural relationship between rich and poor countries. Fourth,
reservation for peaceful purposes (disarmament implications); and
fifth, reservation for future generations (environmental implica-
tions).
(4) Distinguishing between the concepts of functional sovereignty
and territorial sovereignty. Functional sovereignty means juris-
diction over specific uses as distinguished from sovereignty over a
geographic area. Functional sovereignty permits secure accommo-
dation of inclusive and exclusive uses of the sea and the inter-
weaving of national and international jurisdiction in the same geo-
graphical area.
(5) Dealing with the concept of regional development within the
framework of global organization. Many activities, including most
aspects of fisheries management, pollution abatement, and harmoni-
zation of uses, can be dealt with successfully on a regional basis
within the framework of general principles, while other activities,
23. It has already been suggested that coastal State jurisdiction in ocean
space has a natural tendency to expand with technological advance, new
uses of the seas, and the prospect of exclusive control over increasingly de-
sirable resources. An additional factor is the desire of coastal States to pro-
tect themselves against the adverse effects of the activities of other States
in the general vicinity of marine areas already under national jurisdiction.
24. Non-appropriation also characterizes the regime of the high seas
(1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 9, art. 2).
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such as navigation or scientific research, require more direct global
concern.
(6) The creation, not merely of a seabed agency, but of a balanced
international system for ocean space, with powers of administration
and management beyond national jurisdiction, the nature of which
will vary according to the nature of the activity. Only thus can
there be some assurance that the jurisdictional vacuum of the high
seas will be filled, that all States will benefit in same measure from
the new international order, and that serious attempts will
be made to correct environmental and other abuses in ocean space
beyond national jurisdiction.
The question immediately arises: Is the vision of such a new legal
order in the oceans, whatever its theoretical merits, realistic in the
present state of world organization? Would an attempt to achieve
such an order oblige the UNCLOS to start its work again from
scratch and make the results attained so far useless? A rapid exam-
ination of the six requirements for an effective international order
in ocean space will show that comparatively few major changes
would be needed in the present RSNT.
(1) The concept of ocean space. This concept was implicit in cus-
tomary law of the sea. All parts of ocean space in a given area
were, with minor exceptions, subject to the same regime-either in-
ternal waters, territorial sea, or high seas. Only recently were
areas of ocean space fragmented under different regimes with the
introduction into LOS of the continental shelf concept. Although
the RSNT proposes to increase this fragmentation, the unity of re-
gime of different marine areas probably can be restored without
insuperable political objection.
25
25. Perhaps the text is a little simplistic. There are three major prob-
lems: the number of regimes in the oceans, the unity of regimes in each
given area, and the content of each regime. It is unfortunate that the RSNT
has increased unnecessarily the number of regimes in the oceans in order
to satisfy the desires of relatively small groups of coastal States. Are the
contiguous zone and the continental shelf really necessary in the context
of the creation of the EEZ? They add little of substance to the powers
of the coastal State. The unity of regime in each area of ocean space de-
pends upon the extension of the common heritage regime to the waters
above the international seabed area and upon the solution of the legal con-
tinental shelf problem (see infra). The content of each regime is a rather
complex matter that cannot be discussed in a footnote.
(2) Clear and precise definition of the limits of national juris-
diction. Such definition was supposed to be one of the objectives
of the UNCLOS. The main difficulties are the question of base-
lines 26 and that of the continental shelf, principally the latter. States
which have legitimate expectations of being able to assert their
sovereign rights over continental shelf resources substantially
beyond 200-nautical miles from the coast on the basis of the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention (Article 1) are scarcely more than
a dozen; however, States insistent on retaining the right to extend
their legal continental shelf beyond the EEZ are more numerous-
perhaps one fifth of the States represented at the UNCLOS. Oppo-
sition to making the limits of the legal continental shelf (if, indeed,
such a concept need be retained with the creation of the EEZ)
coincide with those of the EEZ could be considerably weakened
by appropriate compromise proposals, 27 and in any case States in-
26. Only minor amendments to the present RSNT are required. These
should make clear that straight baselines may be drawn only between land
points and that they may not exceed a length of x nautical miles.
27. The continental shelf concept was proclaimed by President Truman,
largely in order to enable the United States to exercise sovereign rights
over seabed resources beyond the territorial sea, while maintaining freedom
of naval and commercial navigation in the superjacent waters. The new
concept, however, did not work out in practice as intended. With no precise
limits to the "continental shelf" (the United States has not officially
determined the limits of the "outer continental shelf," and neither is the
1958 Continental Shelf Convention nor the RSNT much help), coastal State
control inevitably expands outwards toward the ocean deeps; equally in-
evitably, as Professor Henkin (Editorial Comment [Henkin], International
Law and "the Interests": the Law of the Seabed, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 504
(1969); Henkin, Comments on Address, "The Limits of the Continental
Shelf-and Beyond," 62 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROc. 243 (1968)) and others have
shown, coastal State assertion of jurisdiction creeps upwards through the
water column to the surface of the sea. Legal characterization of any spe-
cific marine area as "high seas" cannot stop this process; hence I attach little
practical significance to provisions such as those contained in Article 66, part
2, RSNT, supra note 9. If it is desired to stop progressive assertion of
coastal State authority over the waters of ocean space, it is vital to
make the limits of the continental shelf coincide with those of the EEZ
(at least the latter are based on verifiable criteria-distance from base-
lines). In present conditions of rapid change, however, the coincidence of
continental shelf and EEZ limits is probably not sufficient; a permanent
political forum for ocean related questions must be created where alleged
violations of the limits provisions of a future LOS convention can be dis-
cussed and political opinion mobilized. In this context the so-called com-
promise proposals contained in RSNT (supra note 9, pt. 2, art. 70) miss the
main point. Compromises which could weaken resistance to achievement of
the vital objective of integration of the continental shelf with the EEZ
could be (a) purchase at a negotiated price by the future International Sea-
bed Authority of national claims to seabed areas under waters less than 200
metres deep lying more than 200-nautical miles beyond the appropriate
baselines (many countries need money; the ISA could borrow money from
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sisting on the present formulation of Article 64 (part 2 of the
RSNT) could in the last resort be outvoted with comparative
ease.
2 8
(3) The concept of common heritage. The concept has been ac-
cepted for the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. What is now
required is the extention of the concept to the superjacent waters.
This extension should not meet with insuperable political objections
if it is explained that not all the characteristics of the common heri-
tage concept need to be implemented in the same manner in a
future Convention.
29
(4) Concept of functional sovereignty. This concept is often mis-
understood and is unlikely to be accepted explicitly at the UNCLOS.
Nevertheless the concept can provide a useful frame of reference
that would tend to make the RSNT less inconsistent and more able
to regulate constructively activities in the marine environment.
(5) Regional development within the framework of global organi-
zation. This requirement of an effective international order raises
little political difficulty; indeed the RSNT recognizes the desira-
bility of regional cooperation.3 0  What is lacking is a conceptual
framework to provide some order and a minimum of functionality
in implementing present inchoate ideas.
(6) Creation of a balanced international system for ocean space.
the IBRD or other quarters for this purpose); or (b) joint management of
the above defined areas by the ISA and the coastal State concerned with
the coastal State receiving the greater part of potential revenues; or (c) a
combination of (a) and (b) above. The proposals suggested above have
not been made at the UNCLOS.
28. States making extensive continental shelf claims could not muster a
blocking third against determined opposition. The opposition at the
UNCLOS, however, has been lacking not only in determination but also in
political understanding (see note 27 supra), as witness the unbalanced posi-
tion of landlocked countries on this issue.
29. This point is very important. The major objection to extension of
the common-heritage concept to the waters above the international seabed
area is fear of undue interference with military uses of the seas and with
commercial navigation. These fears could be dispelled by appropriate pro-
visions in the text of a treaty. However, general principles for the conduct
of navigation (supplemented by provisions on the lines of RSNT, supra note
9, pt. 2, art. 82) and even for the conduct of peacetime military activities-
for instance, prohibition of the use of ocean space for nuclear explosions-
would be essential in a common-heritage regime. Neither should they
arouse excessive opposition.
30. E.g., RSNT, supra note 9, pt. 2, arts. 129 & 139, pt. 3, passim.
The elements of this system either already exist 3' or may soon be
created. 32 What is required here is the fashioning of some order
and efficiency from the chaotic proliferation of organizations which
could be far more useful than they are at present. Effective ad-
ministrative reorganization is notoriously difficult to achieve;
nevertheless, with regard to organizations whose primary focus is
ocean space activities, internal reorganization and closer coordi-
nation would have been urgent even without an UNCLOS. They are
now indispensable. The UNCLOS cannot, of course, deal with the
problems of internal reorganization of intergovernmental and other
organizations. It can, however, formulate in a protocol to the
future UNCLOS a pattern of interorganizational relationships to
which present ocean space oriented intergovernmental organ-
izations would be expected to conform, and it can make the
necessary provisions within the UNCLOS to ensure that the
prerequisites for the desired reorganization of relationships are
created.3 3 Neither of these steps has been taken; however, they
could be accomplished against predictable bureaucratic opposition,
but without insuperable political objection, provided that there is
a clear idea of what is indispensable and how it can be achieved.8 4
31. E.g., Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO);
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC); Food and Agri-
cultural Organizations (FAO); Committee on Fisheries (COFI); Fisher-
ies Department of FAO, the Marine Resources section of the United Nations;
the International Hydrographic Bureau (IHB); the International Whaling
Commission (IWC); the fisheries commissions and numerous other interna-
tional, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations.
32. E.g., ISA.
33. In my view these prerequisites are (a) the creation of a continuing
political mechanism (i) to serve as a forum where all questions relating
to ocean space may be discussed in their multiple interrelationships; (ii) to
oversee treaty implementation; (iii) to integrate at the policy level the ac-
tivities of ocean space oriented intergovernmental and other organizations;
(b) insofar as possible, specific, instead of general, references to institu-
tional mechanisms in the RSNT (see, e.g., RSNT, supra note 9, pt. 2, arts.
50(2), 53(1)); (c) a protocol outlining the desired pattern of interorgan-
izational relationships with a recommendation addressed to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly and the UN Agencies concerned to take such appropriate ac-
tion as may be within their competence.
34. Some ocean space oriented organizations are United Nations Special-
ized Agencies (e.g., IMCO); others are outside the United Nations system
of organizations (e.g., IWC). Also major activities are conducted by more
or less independent entities within larger organizations (e.g., IOC, COFI)
or administrative subdivisions of much larger organizations (e.g., marine
resources and LOS sections in the United Nations). It is not easy to fashion
some order out of the present situation to enable the various elements of
the existing system to realize their potential. A possible approach could
be:
A permanent mechanism with the nucleus of its Secretariat drawn from
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In conclusion a new, effective, viable, and equitable international
order in ocean space can be attained by the UNCLOS without en-
countering overwhelming political objections and without discard-
ing the bulk of the work done over the past three years.
I believe that the UNCLOS is drifting toward a national, inef-
ficient, and grossly inequitable order in the seas, mainly through
lack of leadership. No State has consistently reminded the
UNCLOS that beyond issues of national interest, vital issues of
world order exist. No State has presented and consistently sup-
ported a concept of a new, balanced world order in the seas that
attempts honestly and realistically to accommodate the objective
realities (technological advance, diversifying ocean uses, growing
demand for resources, new needs for environmental protection, new
needs for international organization, etc.) with the interests of
States. So the UNCLOS has drifted, having as its sole aim the
achievement of a package deal in the context of last ditch defense
of the most peripheral national interest. In this atmosphere of a
cattle market, it is obvious that Ms. Ferguson's landlocked States
are unlikely to make significant progress toward their goals. Nei-
ther can they reasonably complain, for their proposals and initia-
tives have been narrowly conceived, exclusively in their group's
interests, and satisfaction of these interests is not necessary for the
adoption of the Convention. Neither can Professor Clingan be sur-
prised that "it is unlikely that many countries have backed away
from strictly parochial ideas about the zone." Even if "the interests
the present U.N. LOS section to integrate at the policy level the following
organizations:
(a) ISA (part of its Secretariat drawn from the present United Nations
marine resources section);
(b) IMCO;
(c) International Fisheries Organization, composed of a reconstituted
COFI (with Secretariat drawn from FAO Fisheries S.O.), the IWC, a
streamlined system of regional fisheries commissions and miscellaneous
other existing entities. FAO would divest itself of its interests in fisheries.
(d) International Marine Scientific and Technological Organization, con-
stituted by the present IOC, the IHB, and a number of other small organs,
entities, and organizations and also possibly some sections of the World Me-
teorological Organization (WMO) dealing with prevalently marine scien-
tific matters. In addition to present functions of its separate parts, the fu-
ture IMSTO would deal with the promotion of the interchange and transfer
of marine technology, including perhaps the promotion of the establishment
of the regional marine scientific research centres mentioned in part 3 of
of the various countries are . . . identified and understood,"' 3 as
Professor Clingan recommends, this understanding will be of only
marginal help. Why should any country recede from its percep-
tion, however irrational, of the national interest if the UNCLOS is
exclusively an exercise in competitive self-interest?
The vision of a new international order in the seas was the de-
termining factor in the convening of the UNCLOS; progressive
liquefaction of this vision will result either in a treaty unacceptable
to significant States or in ocean space regimes more retrogressive
than those established by the four 1958 Geneva Conventions.
the RSNT. UNESCO would divest itself of its interests in oceanography
and marine science.
The subject area of protection of the marine environment remains open.
One could envisage UNEP retaining full control, but this view does not seem
either practical or satisfactory in view of UNEP's many other concerns. Al-
ternatives are three: (a) competence of the permanent mechanism under
the over-all aegis of UNEP; (b) creation of an international marine ecologi-
cal organization; (c) competence for its own sector, under the over-all aegis
of UNEP, of each of the proposed four basic international organizations for
ocean space. What should be the relationship of the ocean space system
outlined with the United Nations system? For a large number of reasons,
I would favour no direct relationship between any of the four basic interna-
tional organizations and the United Nations or the United Nations Special-
ized Agencies (with the doubtful exception of UNEP). There would be
little objection, however, were the permanent mechanism to establish with
the United Nations a loose relationship similar, mutatis mutandis, to that
established by the IBRD.
35. Clingan, supra note 8, at 546.
